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Zusammenfassung* 
Dieses Diskussionspapier setzt sich – vor dem Hintergrund des bundesdeutschen Alter-
ungsprozesses – mit Zusammenhängen zwischen den Größen (Sozio-)Demografie und Ein-
kommensungleichheit (im Querschnitt) auseinander. Da die Einflussfaktoren auf die perso-
nelle Einkommensverteilung und ihre Beziehungen zueinander höchst komplex sind, er-
scheinen multifaktorielle Ansätze zur Erklärung des personellen Verteilungsgeschehens na-
heliegend. Hierbei fokussiert das Diskussionspapier auf die Rolle der (Sozio-)Demografie bei 
der Erklärung der gemessenen Einkommensungleichheit, indem grundlegende Wirkmecha-
nismen und Übertragungskanäle zwischen Demografie und Einkommensungleichheit thema-
tisiert werden. Dies beinhaltet einen Überblick über bisherige Untersuchungen zur hier rele-
vanten Fragestellung.  
 
 
Summary* 
This discussion paper deals with connections between the variables (socio-)demography and 
income inequality (in a cross-sectional perspective against the background of Germany’s 
ageing process). Since the factors of influence and their relationships to each other are ex-
tremely complex, multifactorial approaches for explaining the distribution of personal incomes 
seem to be obvious. In this context the discussion paper focuses on the role of (so-
cio-)demography in explaining the measured income inequality insofar as fundamental 
mechanisms of action and transmission channels are main subjects of discussion. This con-
tains an overview over former analyses concerning the questions important in this paper. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Dr. Jürgen Faik ist Geschäftsführer von FaMa – Neue Frankfurter Sozialforschung. Autoren-Kontakt: 
faik@fama-nfs.de  
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1. Introduction 
This paper deals with connections between socio-demography and income inequality. Socio-
demographic variables are e. g. age, sex, employment status, household size, household 
composition, family status, religion, migration background, or status of education. 
Against the background of Germany’s ageing process, the social relations between genera-
tions – trenchantly: between the “old” and the “young” – become increasingly important. On 
the founded supposition that individual possibilities for development are primarily based on 
economic scopes for action, a comprehensive well-being analysis seems to be adequate.1 
Ideally, such a well-being analysis comprises, beyond the typical indicator income, further 
well-being indicators like wealth or private consumption.2 
The ageing of societies primarily concerns indirect demographic effects which are, not least, 
mediated by the tax-transfer system. At this, in Germany especially the pay-as-you-go-
procedure of the national retirement system and its intergenerational distributional problems 
are focused. In a politico-economic view the demographic change also causes – on the basis 
of (utility-)maximising decisions of governments – modified political decisions. Furthermore, 
the demographic development affects the accrual of incomes (via changes in relative prices 
and via disincentives concerning the beginning of work) as well as the application of incomes 
(via age-specific consumption and saving rates or via age-differentiated consumption struc-
tures). In this context (at least partly), the aspects of the distribution, the accrual, and the 
application of incomes are connected interdependently. Thus, the question about the distri-
bution of income is linked up with aspects of economic growth. This underlines the relevance 
of connections between (socio-)demography and personal income distribution. 
Since social conflicts reveal themselves on a cross-sectional level, the consideration of 
cross-sectional income inequality is highly important in a socio-political sense (not least for 
the practical social policy). This comprises the determination of the personal (periodical) in-
come distribution as well as the investigation of connections between (cross-sectional) period 
incomes and (longitudinal) lifetime incomes. The comparative analysis of the distribution of 
lifetime incomes makes sense, inter alia because such an analysis can avoid contortions 
which are elicited by population’s age structure. Performing such an analysis, cohort effects 
can be isolated. Nevertheless, this paper concentrates on cross-sectional aspects of the per-
sonal income distribution. 
Still until the 1980s, the connection between demography and income distribution was treat-
ed as an orphan. Primarily, this had two causes: firstly, the connection between population 
and production seemed to be more relevant, and secondly, the direction between demogra-
phy and income distribution seemed to be clear in the sense that population’s growth would 
cause a more unequal income distribution. This causality returned to the classics (with their 
emphasis of the functional income distribution): the classics argued that an increase of the 
landowners’ income and a decrease of the workers’ income would be inevitable. In their opin-
ion the increase of the landowners’ income would result from the principle of differential 
rents, i. e. that the profit stemming from landownership would be determined through the 
yield of the worst ground; the latter was called the marginal yield. In case of population’s 
growth the fertile ground would be scarce because of increasing needs for food. This would 
increase the share of rents with respect to national income. Furthermore, a rapidly growing 
population would diminish the capital intensity, and because of this the relative price of capi-
tal would rise. How far these effects do influence income distribution, depends on the con-
crete degree of substitution of capital through labour.3 
                                                            
1 Beneath monetary incomes and charges, non-monetary income elements and price privileges are 
relevant (see Fachinger and Schmähl 2004, p. 537). 
2  These indicators might be pooled in a single indicator (e. g. following the concept of a well-being 
indicator proposed by Weisbrod and Hansen 1968). 
3 See Felderer and Sauga 1988, pp. 207-208. 
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Even in case that a compensation of the price increases of capital by the substitution of capi-
tal through labour takes place, there are some reasons for an increasing income inequality 
as a consequence of population’s growth:4 
1. A rising fertility in the lower than in the higher income ranges leads in case of relative-
ly low individual opportunities of advancement to an increasing income inequality. 
2. High birth rates probably reduce the expenditures for education per child; this gener-
ates a higher income inequality in the next generation. 
3. Rising numbers of inhabitants typically increase the population share of the young 
age groups which, by tendency, are located at the bottom ends of jobs’ and incomes’ 
hierarchies; this corresponds with increasing income differences. 
Paglin (1975) and Kuznets (1976) opened a corresponding, international debate in the mid-
1970s by asking how demographic variables do affect the measured (cross-sectional) in-
come inequality.5 In their opinion a positive statistical correlation between household size and 
household income would be realistic, and the household incomes would depend on the age 
of the household heads in an inverse U-shape. Taking together both connections, this formu-
lates dependencies between the household incomes’ distribution and the distribution of 
households concerning their size and concerning the age distribution (of household heads).6 
Particularly three pure demographic factors can be differentiated with respect to the age dis-
tribution: the mean age (of the labour force), the dispersion (of the labour force), and the old-
age dependency ratio.7 
Beneath the age distribution, e. g. the changes in household composition, which are caused 
by social change, are very relevant for inequality purposes. Generally speaking, in the con-
text of decomposing inequality, differentiations between the effects of different kinds of in-
come and different income structures are as important as socio-demographic influences 
(e. g. age or household structures). 
Since the factors of influence on the personal income distribution and on each of their inter-
nal relationships are highly complex, multifactorial approaches for explaining aspects of the 
personal income distribution appear to be obvious. Questions, arising in this context, are: 
How does the tax-transfer system affect the secondary income distribution via redistributions 
of market incomes? What kind of influence on the personal income distribution do individual 
preferences or decisions of entrepreneurs concerning the employment of young versus old 
persons have? Are changes of household size or household composition very relevant for 
aspects of the personal income distribution? Chapter 2 is concerned with such questions. 
Subsequently, Chapter 3 focuses insofar on the role of (socio-)demography in explaining the 
measured income inequality as fundamental mechanisms of action and transmission chan-
nels between (socio-)demography and income inequality are addressed. Based on these 
considerations, Chapter 4 gives an overview over former investigations concerning the is-
sues discussed in this paper. Last but not least, in Chapter 5 the discussion paper’s consid-
erations and findings are perspectively summarised. 
 
 
                                                            
4 See Felderer and Sauga 1988, p. 208. In an empirical cross-country study on a cross-sectional data-
base Chenery et al. 1974, p. 17, found that an increase of the population’s rate of growth in the 
amount of one percent leaded to an increase of income inequality in the amount of 1.6 percent. 
5 Concerning the ”Paglin debate“ see Paglin 1975 as well as Nelson 1977, Johnson 1977, Danziger, 
Haveman, and Smolensky 1977, Minarik 1977, Kurien 1977, Paglin 1977, Wertz 1979, Paglin 1979, 
Formby, Seaks, and Smith 1989, and Paglin 1989. 
6 For corresponding studies see also Kuznets 1976, Morrisson 1978, Morley 1981, Mookherjee and 
Shorrocks 1982, Lecaillon et al. 1984, pp. 43-46, or Black, Hayes, and Slottje 1989; see also the over-
view in Heerink 1994, p. 177. 
7 See von Weizsäcker 1993, pp. 23-25. 
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2. Multifactorial explanation attempts of the personal income distribution 
Since singular explanation attempts – like the human-capital approach – can only explain a 
small part of the whole income variance8 or are economically unsatisfiable – like the (pure) 
stochastic approaches9 –, it seems justified to recur on multifactorial explanatory models. 
For example, Jenkins‘ (1995) analysis, which will be considered in more detail in Chapter 4, 
differentiates between the following explanatory factors concerning the distribution of per-
sonal household net equivalent incomes:10 
1. changes in age structure, 
2. changes in household composition, 
3. changes in employment structure, 
4. changes in the structure of branches, 
5. changes with respect to unemployment, 
6. changes of the business cycle, 
7. changes in the tax and in the transfer system, 
8. changes in inequality of wages, and 
9. changes in capital incomes. 
Subsequently, two older but still important multifactorial approaches will be considered: 
Grüske’s (1985) and von Weizsäcker’s (1986) approach. The aim in this context is to give an 
impression of the diversity of the personal income distribution concerning its causes. 
 
 
2.1 Grüske’s multifactorial approach 
Grüske (1985) named individual explanatory factors as well as market-determined and insti-
tutional factors. 
The individual factors were organized by Grüske in a tripartite classification: 
1. non-influenceable individual factors: 
a. inborn characteristics (sex, etc.), 
b. environment (parents, cultural environment), 
c. age, 
d. inherited wealth; 
 
2. partly influenceable individual factors: 
a. health, 
b. abilities, 
c. dynamic factors (motivation, mobility, diligence, personality, etc.), 
d. “connections“; 
                                                            
8 Mincer (1976, p. 146) e. g. – one of the apologists of the human-capital approach – calculated de-
termination coefficients only in the amount of about 50 percent at the maximum for the regression 
between labour income and the main explanatory variable education. Other authors estimated still 
lower explanatory values for the human-capital approach. Thurow (1981, p. 167) reported for this con-
nection determination coefficients between only 20 and 30 percent. Concerning the human-capital 
model and its explanatory power see also Wolff 2009, pp. 247-258. 
9 For an overview over such approaches see e. g. Sahota 1978. Blinder (1974, p. 7) encapsulates the 
critique of the (pure) stochastic approaches: ”Assuming a stochastic mechanism, no matter how com-
plex, to be the sole determinant of income inequality is to give up before one starts. It is antithetical to 
the mainstream of economic theory which seeks to explain complex phenomena as the end result of 
deliberate choices by decision-makers. (…) One would hope that economics could do better than 
that.” 
10 See Jenkins 1995, pp. 32-35. In this context see also Wolff 2009, Part II, for a similar methodologi-
cal perspective. 
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3. individually influenceable factors: 
a. (further) education, 
b. job, job experience, training on the job, 
c. individual utility functions with decisions e. g. concerning working versus lei-
sure time or consumption versus saving, 
d. formation of households. 
Out of these individual factors only individual wealth influences income directly in Grüske’s 
model. Wealth in period t is defined as follows (on the simplifying supposition of constant 
saving rates and constant rates of return over time): 
(1)      iY
i1t1t
1i
sq1s
0
V1tsq1q
t
V 


  . 
In this equation the meaning of the variables is: t: period of time (of occupation), V0: an indi-
vidual’s wealth inherited in period   (t=1) or possessed at the beginning of occupation 
(=0), s: an individual’s saving rate, q: an individual’s rate of return on financial and non-
financial assets, Y: individual disposable income. 
With respect to Equation (1), a positive correlation between saving rate and inherited wealth 
seems plausible; the same holds true for the connection between saving rate and disposable 
income. A person with a high income or wealth will (can) normally form more savings than a 
person with a low income or wealth. The multiplicative conjunction of these variables in 
Equation (1) leads to a right-skewed wealth distribution. Additionally, this right-skewness is 
still reinforced via the multiplicative linkage and via the positive correlation of saving rate, 
income, and wealth with the rate of return on assets. 
For almost all other individual factors Grüske also considered a right-skewed distribution 
(with corresponding effects on the overall personal income distribution). In distinction from 
wealth the other individual factors influence income only indirectly – as determinants of la-
bour supply. 
In order to determine the personal (labour) income distribution it is necessary to consider the 
labour demand as well as the labour supply. In this context Grüske assumed (empirically 
well-founded) that the individual labour income increases with a rising qualification level; 
here, the qualification level is represented by education. On the further supposition of a right-
skewed distribution of the several qualification groups, even an equilibrium on the labour 
market (labour supply = labour demand) generates a right-skewed (labour) income distribu-
tion. Because of the plausible positive correlation between qualification level and (labour) 
income the (density) curve of the personal (labour) income distribution is more right-skewed 
than the frequency curves of the several qualification levels. 
Furthermore, in his model Grüske considered effects resulting from disequilibriums on labour 
market. Exemplarily, he assumed that in the lower area of qualifications the supply is higher 
than the demand for labour (et vice versa in case of high qualifications). Such disequilibriums 
lead to diminishing (labour) incomes of the lower qualification levels and to rising (labour) 
incomes of the higher qualification levels. This causes a strengthening of the right-skewness 
of the (labour) income distribution compared with the situation of an equilibrium on labour 
market. 
Grüske considered the institutional factors of the personal income distribution only rudimen-
tarily. He stressed the point that the so-called hierarchy effect, which possibly holds true for 
the upper income area, should be complemented with the influence of collective bargainings 
for middle and bottom income groups. The hierarchy effect means, simply speaking, that the 
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payments of managers are positively correlated with the size of their staff.11 The role of tradi-
tion should also be regarded as an institutional factor – in the sense that it can influence the 
hierarchy effect as well as the results of collective bargainings. 
Last but not least, Grüske characterised chance as a principally explainable residuum, and 
he stressed the point that stochastic influences can affect the other variables of the model 
permanently as well as transitorily. 
The following figure gives an overview over Grüske’s approach; basically, this model is – in 
my eyes – helpful for structuring the coherences of the personal income distribution and its 
determinants. 
 
Figure 1: Grüske’s model 
Individual factors
Market‐determined
factors
Institutional factors
Labour supply
Chance
Labour demand
Personal income
distribution
(Wealth)
 
Source: Grüske 1985, p. 51 
 
 
 
2.2 Von Weizsäcker’s multifactorial approach 
Another multifactorial approach stems from von Weizsäcker (1986). It solely deals with the 
distribution of labour incomes. Loosely speaking, it is a synthesis between pure stochastic 
and human-capital theoretical approaches (but additionally taking into account further ex-
planatory variables). With respect to the extent of the object of study and to the number of 
explanatory variables von Weizsäcker’s approach is not as comprehensive as Grüske’s 
model sketched in Section 2.1 (because of a more restrictive income definition and because 
of fewer explanatory factors), but it is theoretically, i. e. from a microeconomic point of view, 
much more elaborated than Grüske’s model. 
                                                            
11 See Lydall 1968, pp. 128-129. 
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Von Weizsäcker divided that part of the income equation which represents the proportional 
income effect in the usual stochastic models12 – i. e. (1+t) – in an expected factor of growth 
of the individual income (1+Tt) and in a residual factor of growth that is determined purely 
stochastic [(1+et)]. 
With (1+t):= (1+Tt) (1+et) the individual labour income in period (t+1) equals: 
(2)     1t1tt1t e1T1YY  
 
or 
(3)   
   .e1T1YY t
0i
1i
t
0i
1i01t 



 
 
Alternatively, the expected labour income in period (t+1) can be considered. On the supposi-
tions that E(et+1) = 0 and hence E(1+et+1) = 1, the expected labour income in (t+1) is: 
(4)   
 
   
 







t
0i
1i0
1tt
1t1t
.T1Y
T1YE
YEA
 
Inserting Equation (4) into Equation (3) yields: 
(5)   
 


t
0i
itt e1AY
 
or (using logarithms: Xt:= log Yt and ut:= log (1+et)) 
(6)  


t
0i
itt .uAlogX  
On the supposition that the ui are independently and identically distributed and on the basis 
of the central limit theorem, for large values of t an asymptotical normal distribution of the 
logarithmical labour incomes Xt or – equivalently: – an asymptotical log-normal distribution of 
the labour incomes Yt results. 
The above mentioned income component At can – referring to Friedman‘s permanent income 
hypothesis – be named as a permanent income component, and  


t
0i
it e1:C  can be 
labeled as a transitory income element. 
                                                            
12 The law of the proportional effect (the so-called ”loi de l’effet proportionnel“) was firstly (and explicit-
ly) formulated by Gibrat. With respect to the variable income it means that the relative rate of growth 
concerning income is a random variable and that the probability distribution of the proportional income 
changes is independent of the current income level. The individual income in period t+1 results from 
the individual income in the previous period t, and this is accompanied by a random impact. The ran-
dom impact is a multiplicative one (see Gibrat 1931, pp. 63-64). 
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The transitory character of Ct reveals itself by the fact that this variable is individually not ex-
pectable. The shocks represented by Ct change their values continuously. Because of this, in 
the model it is assumed that the expectancy value of Ct equals one (resulting from E(et) = 0); 
i. e., the income effects of the stochastic shocks cancel each other in a long-term perspec-
tive, and they do not have a permanent impact on the income levels individually expected. 
In order to switch from the individual labour income distribution to the whole economy’s la-
bour income distribution, inter alia it must be considered that (in von Weizsäcker’s model) the 
several individuals differ from each other concerning their expected income levels At. 
Assuming stochastic independence between At and Ct, the theoretical distribution function for 
labour income in t is: 
(7)    .dydaa
yfaf
a
1F tt
t
t
Ct
Y
A
t
Y t
t
tt



  


  
[Remark: whereas fAt and fCt represent the density functions of At and Ct, yt, at, and (yt/at) 
symbolise the realisations of the random variables Yt, At, and Ct.] 
Since Ct solely reflects stochastic impacts (see above), an economisation of the model is 
realised via At. Because of the foundation of von Weizsäcker’s model on human-capital theo-
ry an individual possesses a certain quantity of human capital (HKt) in period t. It is assumed 
that this individual only takes the fraction (1-ht) for activities concerning the acquisition of 
money; the residual fraction ht he uses – during his working period – for investments in (fur-
ther) education. 
Following these premises, the (expected) disposable labour income in t (:= At) consists of the 
human-capital stock in t valued by the factor price R (:= R * HKt). From this, the income lost 
as a consequence of fees for educational purposes (:= R * ht * HKt) and the quantity of goods 
and services purchased for education and valued by a price (:= P * Dt) need to be subtracted: 
(8)   
  ttt
ttttt
DPh1HKR
DPHKhRHKRA


 
with: ht  [0; 1], Dt  [0; ], R > 0, P > 0 (t = 0, 1, 2, …, n). 
The investments in (further) education imply that the individual human-capital stock is varia-
ble over time. The new production of human capital in t represents “learning by doing” during 
the working period – i. e. during (1-ht) – as well as the explicit accumulation of human capital 
in the stadium of education – i. e. during ht. 
In this context, the accumulation of human capital can be described via a production function 
Qt, e. g. via a Cobb-Douglas production function with decreasing economies of scale: 
(9)    21 btbtt0t DHKhbQ 
 
with: b0 >0, b1 >0, b2 > 0, b1 + b2 < 1 (t = 0, 1, 2, …, n). 
In Equation (9) the elasticities of production b1 and b2 of the inputs ht * HKt and Dt shall have 
the same amount for all members of society. In contrast, b0 shall vary individually: b0 symbol-
ises an individual’s ability to increase his own production capacities during the working peri-
od. 
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In von Weizsäcker’s model b0 is influenced by a number of factors. Direct factors of influence 
are the individual learning’s ability (LA), Lydall‘s D factor (DF)13 and some other characteris-
tics of personality (QPC; the willingness of leading and managing, the ability or willingness to 
accept responsibility, etc.), so-called ”class-rank“ variables (CR; e. g. school marks), and the 
quality of schooling (SQ). Indirectly b0 is influenced – via LA and partly via DF – by hereditary 
factors (G), family background (HO), and cultural impacts (CU). Thus, for b0 the following 
function results: 
(10)  
b0 = b0 (LA(G, HO, CU); DF(HO, CU); QPC; CR; SQ)) 
with: b0/LA > 0, b0/DF > 0, b0/QPC > 0, b0/CR > 0, b0/SQ > 0. 
Beyond that, it must be considered that a certain quantity of human capital needs to be re-
duced in value per period (:= ) e. g. because of deteriorations of the short-term memory 
with increasing age or because of devaluations of qualification in the course of technological 
changes. 
Considering , leads to the human-capital stock in period (t+1): 
(11)    ttttt1t HKHKh1cQHKHK    
with: HK0 > 0 given and t = 0, 1, 2, …, n-1. 
In von Weizsäcker’s model an individual is maximising his labour income over his entire life-
cycle. That means that an individual tries to maximise the present value of his disposable 
labour incomes per period – i. e. . The interest rate on the (perfect) capital market r (> 0) 
represents the discounting factor: 
(12)    .!maxr1A: n
0t
t
tt 


 
Equation (11) for HKt+1 is the restriction within this problem of maximisation. 
In the context of von Weizsäcker’s approach it can be dealt with inequality differences be-
tween longitudinal lifetime incomes on the one hand and cross-sectional period incomes on 
the other hand. By tendency, the period incomes are at least on a level with the lifetime in-
comes (the latter in the sense of the present value of the individual period incomes), the 
 larger the sum of fertility and mortality rate, 
 larger the population shares of the younger cohorts, 
 smaller the interest rate r, 
 worse the abilities for learning by doing, 
 faster the decreases of producitivity caused by ageing, 
 smaller the human-capital elasticities of production b1 and b2, 
 larger the mean efficiency of full-time schooling a1, 
 larger the average initial human-capital stock a0 
is/are.14 
An increasing rate of ageing  leads, e. g. and ceteris paribus, to a reduction of inequality of 
lifetime incomes. The reason for this is that to a greater degree more “able” individuals (i. e. 
individuals with a higher a1 and/or a higher b0) are involved in human-capital losses com-
                                                            
13 Lydall‘s D factor comprises non-cognitive abilities like personality characterised among themselves 
by a number of elements, e. g.: assertiveness, tenacity, ambition, willingness to work hard, willingness 
for risk taking, or ability to cooperate with other people (see Lydall 1981, p. 135). 
14 Remark: the inequality indicator used by von Weizsäcker is the squared coefficient of variation. 
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pared with less “able” persons. The same holds true e. g. for a deterioration of the abilities for 
learning by doing. 
Von Weizsäcker’s approach comprises a number of empirically testable hypotheses which 
can be allocated to the groups of direct versus indirect (socio-)demographic influences. In the 
following, we will deal with such influences and with their connections to the personal income 
distribution in more detail. 
 
 
 
 
3. Demographic factors of influence concerning the personal income distribution  
Out of the factors of influence sketched in Section 2.1, in this chapter we will refer to the indi-
vidual factors (age, sex, education, etc). In this context an impact from demography towards 
income inequality will be assumed. Influences, which are contrary to this – i. e. impacts from 
income inequality towards demography –, will be neglected. 
 
 
 
3.1 Population’s growth and income inequality: basic connections 
In this section “pure” effects generated by population size (Section 3.1.1) as well as differen-
tial population size effects (Section 3.1.2) will be treated. It must be stressed that the corre-
sponding remarks will concentrate on individual incomes, i. e. that the household context will 
be neglected; the same holds true for equivalence scales. Such necessary methodological 
extensions with respect to the measurement of income inequality will be introduced not until 
Section 3.2. 
 
 
3.1.1 Population size and income inequality 
Concerning the following figure it is assumed that the number of births increases continuous-
ly starting in a certain point of time. For example, this means a doubling of births, so that the 
number of persons one year old will be twice as high in t+1 than in t, the same shall be valid 
for persons two years old, etc. From the age of 20 years on, persons shall be part of statis-
tics of (income) distribution. Thus, (ceteris paribus) it will last 20 years until the model’s popu-
lation will raise its size (by doubling the size of the youngest cohort, consisting of persons 20 
years old). Assuming that all people will die in the age of 80 years, it will last exactly 80 peri-
ods until the persons born in the starting period will have been completely involved in the 
demographic changes sketched, and a new stationary state will be reached. This new sta-
tionary state is characterised by twice as much people in each age cohort compared with 
period t (which means a doubling of the model’s population). Moreover, this kind of purely 
concentrating on changes of population size produces the same (relative) age distribution in 
the new stationary state (in t+80) as in the initial situation (in t).15 
 
                                                            
15 See Pohmer 1989, p. 105. 
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Figure 2: Growing population size and income inequality (individual incomes) 
                – idealised consideration 
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Source: Author’s own illustration referring to Pohmer 1989, p. 108 
Hence (ignoring cohort effects), the income inequality in the last period (in t+80) is exactly as 
high as in the initial period (in t). Compared with this, in the transition period between the two 
stationary states changes in the measured inequality exist. Decomposing total income ine-
quality into a within-group and a between-group component, principally reveals that the 
measured income inequality (ceteris paribus) the higher is the larger a) income inequality in 
each age group is and b) deviations of the age-specific mean incomes from the social mean 
value are. Concerning aspect a) it is an empirical finding that a U-shape of the internal in-
come inequality over the several age groups typically occurs. The age-specific mean income 
(aspect b)) has an inverse U-shape in many empirical cases; i. e., in young and in old years 
of age the mean incomes are lower (and in the middle stage of live they are higher) than the 
social mean income.16 
These processes and a “younger” age structure lead to an increase of income inequality for 
20 periods. Subsequently, inequality decreases (in Figure 2 from the 40th period on) because 
the frequencies of the age groups with a relatively low internal income inequality and an in-
come level near the social mean income increase. At the end of the demographic transition 
the frequencies of the older persons with a relatively high group-specific income inequality 
and a mean income below the overall mean income rise, and so again the income inequality 
increases (starting with the 60th period). When (in the 80th period) the demographic process-
es are terminated, total income inequality will reach its initial level, as mentioned above.17 
In the inverse case of continuously decreasing frequencies in the several age classes, the 
inequality processes will be quasi mirror-inverted, as is shown in Figure 3. At first the ine-
quality decreases in order to increase later at a certain period of time (in the 40th period), and 
then (from the 60th period on) it decreases towards the initial level which is reached at the 
end of the relevant process (in the 80th period).18 
                                                            
16 Below we will deal with this issue in more detail. 
17 See Pohmer 1989, pp. 106-108. 
18 See Pohmer 1989, pp. 111-114. 
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Figure 3: Decreasing population size and income inequality (individual incomes) 
               – idealised consideration 
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Source: Author’s own illustration referring to Pohmer 1989, p. 112 
 
Early analytical models concerning the (interdependent) connections between income distri-
bution and population’s growth stem from Ogawa (1978), Winegarden (1978), and Repetto 
(1979). Winegarden stated, on the basis of a simultaneous multi-equations regression, that 
empirically a deceleration of population’s growth would have an inequality reducing effect. 
Furthermore, he explained that a smaller degree of income inequality would dampen popula-
tion’s growth. Especially it was found that the impact of population’s growth on income distri-
bution would have been (much) stronger than conversely. Later studies, e. g. done by Rod-
gers (1983) or Winegarden (1980, 1985), used time-lags for the connections between in-
come inequality and demography – modeling the demographic variables as lagged variables; 
the resulting models were (partly) recursive.19 
 
 
3.1.2 Differential fertility and differential mortality 
For a sustainable population’s ageing a persistent reduction of the growth rates of births is 
necessary. In this context, differential fertility, which e. g. means a reduction of the fertility of 
the upper income groups, has other consequences for age structure and income inequality 
than a general fertility reduction across all income classes.20 
Lam (1986) simulated several inequality processes as reactions on differential fertility (by 
using the alternative inequality indicators logarithmic income variance and squared coeffi-
                                                            
19 See Heerink 1994, p. 5. 
20 Furthermore, migration does not influence per se but through (age-specific) changes in the immigra-
tion rates population’s ageing and income inequality. See von Weizsäcker 1996, p. 3. 
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cient of variation, and by applying cross-section data of Brazil).21 Differential fertility in Lam’s 
study also meant a faster population’s growth of the bottom income groups compared with 
the upper income classes. Whereas in this case the effects on the arithmetic mean of the 
personal income distribution were unambiguous (in the direction of a decreasing mean val-
ue), the corresponding inequality effects were less clear. Lam carved out the following condi-
tions for constant or changing values of the logarithmic variance and of the squared coeffi-
cient of variation:22 
(13)  Logarithmic variance (LV): 
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(14)  squared coefficient of variation (QCV): 
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[LV: logarithmic variance, n: initial population size, m: “added“ population, m: logarithm of 
the arithmetic mean income of population m, n: logarithm of the arithmetic mean income of 
population n, QCV: squared coefficient of variation, mY : arithmetic mean income of group m, 
nY : arithmetic mean income of group n]. 
According to Lam, income inequality will “undoubtedly” increase as a consequence of differ-
ential fertility if the (“mover’s”) probability for a child in the lowest income class to climb into a 
higher income class is lower than the (“stayer’s”) probability to stay in the lowest income 
class.23 
Ahluwalia (1976) also illuminated connections between demography – more specific: popula-
tion’s growth – and income inequality in a differential perspective. He assumed no mobility 
between high and low incomes. Additionally, he postulated – like Lam – that the poor house-
holds would have a faster population’s growth than the richer households. In case of a large 
population’s growth this would result in a remarkable increase of income inequality.24 
                                                            
21 The corresponding considerations are based on individual incomes. With a few modifications they 
can be transferred to the level of household (equivalent) incomes relatively easily. 
22 See Lam 1986, pp. 1104-1106. 
23 See Lam 1986, p. 1110. Chu 1987 showed in a replica to Lam’s article that the rule mentioned is a 
necessary but not a sufficient criterion in this context. 
24 See Ahluwalia 1976, pp. 326-327; for a similar approach see Morley 1981. 
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Like both aforementioned studies, Repetto (1978) dealt with the interactions between fertility 
and income inequality. He stated a non-linear, typically U-shaped connection between in-
come and fertility. On this basis, Repetto noted with respect to the reverse impact of differen-
tial fertility on income inequality that a low fertility at the bottom and at the top of income’s 
hierarchy would tend to an increase of the labour income inequality25 
Concerning differential mortality, Grimm and Cogneau (2005) showed that a negative as well 
as a positive correlation between mortality and income tend to generate inequality reduc-
tions. The reason for this would be that in both (correlation) cases individuals at the bottom 
or at the top of the income distribution would be “eliminated”. In distinction from that (“trun-
cated”) case, in Grimm and Cogneau’s model a very high mortality in the middle income 
classes leads to an inequality increase.26 
Whereas – in a very simplified perspective – differential fertility (at the bottom and/or at the 
top of income’s hierarchy) “adds” persons (or households) at the margins of the income dis-
tribution with the consequence of an increasing income inequality by tendency, differential 
mortality (at the bottom and/or at the top of income’s hierarchy) “eliminates” persons (or 
households) at the margins of the income distribution which generates a reduction of income 
inequality. 
 
 
 
3.2 Direct and indirect demographic impacts on the inequality of equivalent incomes 
3.2.1 Preliminary remark 
With respect to the connections between (socio-)demography and income inequality a differ-
entiation between direct and indirect impacts of (socio-)demography makes sense. Direct 
demography effects are solely defined by changes in population shares on the supposition of 
constant economic variables (like mean incomes or dispersions of incomes for the several 
socio-demographic groups). In contrast, indirect demographic effects aim at economic pro-
cesses which are relevant for distributional purposes. Examples for such economic process-
es are individual adjustment reactions (e. g. on the labour market with dependencies on an 
individual’s own age but also on other market participants’ age) or fiscal aspects like the 
compliance of budget restrictions.27  
Simplified (and in a cross-sectional perspective) and referring to the different income sources 
– labour income, capital income, and (net) transfers –, three main transmission channels for 
indirect demographic changes exist: the labour market, the capital market, and the tax-
transfer system. Additionally, in Figure 4 the channels “application of income” and “macroe-
conomic level” are depicted.28 These latter channels are only subordinated influences com-
pared with the first three channels mentioned; partly they depend on the main channels. For 
reasons of simplicity such interrelations are not pointed out in Figure 4. Moreover, in Figure 4 
feedbacks from personal income distribution towards demography (or towards the other indi-
cated variables) are not marked. 
 
 
                                                            
25 See Repetto 1978, pp. 25-26.  
26 See Grimm and Cogneau 2005, pp. 11-12. 
27 See von Weizsäcker 1994a, pp. 33-34 (principally, in this context see also von Weizsäcker 1994b).  
28 See also in this context Heerink 1994, p. 2. 
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Figure 4: Idealised transmission channels of demography on income inequality 
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Source: Author’s own illustration 
In the following sections, we will refer to the several transmission channels fragmentarily 
(and partly exemplarily) to give a short overview.  
 
 
3.2.2 The direct demographic influence of the household structure 
The direct (and differential) demographic effects of fertility and mortality29 were discussed in 
Section 3.1 in detail. In this section, additionally, it will be referred to the inequality effects of 
the household structure.30 
In this context, Burtless pointed out that changes at the level of households would provide 
two ways to impact on income inequality. Firstly, the change of a small towards a larger 
household can lead to the situation that especially young, non-working persons participate in 
the relatively high incomes of ”new” household members. Secondly, gains of welfare result 
from economies of scale in the context of larger households. If there is no pronounced posi-
tive correlation between the corresponding individual incomes, the measured inequality will 
                                                            
29 The additional question about direct distributional effects of migration can be seen as an “appendix” 
to the distributional considerations of (differential) fertility and mortality. Furthermore, the socio-demo-
graphic variable age can be interpreted as a resultant of the three basic demographic factors men-
tioned before. 
30 Fundamentally, the household structure can be separated into all socio-demographic variables ini-
tially mentioned, i. e. age, sex, labour market status, etc. (of the household members, in each case). 
Since the age distribution depends – as mentioned in the footnote before – on the fundamental demo-
graphic factors fertility, mortality, and migration, the household structure itself has some connections to 
the three other (socio-)demographic variables listed in Figure 4. 
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be smaller if the adults’ individual incomes are pooled within a joint household – compared 
with the situation in which the corresponding adults live alone. Reversely, that means that 
inequality will rise if the share of couples decreases and the (positive) correlation between 
the adults’ incomes (in the sense of homogamy) increases. A similar result is reached if low-
income receivers live alone disproportionately high.31 
Empirically, e. g. in Germany the mean values of the household size have decreased for a 
long time, as can be seen by Figure 5 for (western) Germany since 1961. 
Figure 5: Mean household sizes in (western) Germany 1961-2008 (arithmetic mean) 
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Source: http://www.destatis.de  
 
 
It is plausible that – ceteris paribus – in case of decreasing mean household sizes the kurto-
sis of the equivalent income’s frequency distribution will be higher in its lower area compared 
with the status before such a reduction of (mean) household sizes. The reason for this is that 
the development towards more single-person households reduces the arithmetic mean of the 
equivalent incomes by tendency. This is the consequence of the fact that a former joint 
household income of two or more persons within a multi-person household is now disaggre-
gated into two or more incomes for single-person households for which economies of scales 
are irrelevant. However, opposing effects resulting from a decrease of the mean household 
sizes can occur with respect to the mean equivalent income: a relatively low fertility can lead 
to higher (equivalent) incomes for childless couples (for the so-called DINKs; DINK = “double 
income no kids”).32 
                                                            
31 See Burtless 2009, pp. 437-441. 
32 See in this context Peichl, Pestel, and Schneider 2009, p. 2. 
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In a number of articles Kuznets (1976, 1981, 1982) stressed the relevance of variations of 
household size concerning the distribution of household incomes. His arguments focused on 
a positive correlation between household size and household income. The latter he ex-
plained as follows:33 
 Larger households would typically consist of more persons in an employable age – 
with strong incentives to work for these persons because of bigger needs of larger 
households. 
 For larger households, the share of male household heads would be higher than the 
share of female household heads, and households with male household heads would 
typically have a higher income than households with female household heads. 
 In larger households the share of household heads in a middle-age class would be 
relatively high, and the middle-aged persons (as household heads) would commonly 
have higher incomes than young and old persons (as household heads). 
Empirically, it was found that a corresponding positive correlation between household size 
and household income existed in all countries observed, but that the connection between 
household size and household income per capita34 was, by tendency, stronger in countries 
with a rather low mean household size than in countries with a relatively high mean house-
hold size.35 
The aforementioned aspects primarily referred to mean (equivalent) incomes. With respect to 
the dispersion of (equivalent) incomes, generated by impacts of household size, it is much 
more difficult to make substantial points. A more elaborated paper than the one presented 
here has to deal with this issue. 
 
 
 
3.2.3 Labour market 
In the context of (socio-)demographic influences mediated by the labour market four groups 
of themes are remarkable: a) demographically caused relative prices of the factor labour, b) 
the labour market participation of different groups (especially the participation of women), c) 
group-specific unemployment (rates), and d) the shape and the development of age-earnings 
profiles. 
 
a) Demographically caused relative prices of the factor labour 
Here, relative relations of scarceness between the production factors labour and capital (and 
also within the production factors named) are important; they correspond with wage-interest 
effects resulting from demographic changes and from changes of the labour force potential. 
Rodgers stated – on the basis of a (questionable) equalisation of functional and personal 
income distribution – in a neo-classical sense that a high population’s growth would increase 
the relative supply of the labour force compared with the other production factors; this would 
                                                            
33 See Kuznets 1981. 
34 Qualitatively, this argumentation is also valid concerning the connection between household size 
and household equivalent income. 
35 See Heerink 1994, pp. 196-197. In according with Kuznets’ arguments reported above, increases in 
the shares of women and young persons with respect to all gainfully employed persons lead, further-
more, to a higher degree of earnings’ inequality within the group of single-person households and to 
an increase of earnings’ inequality within the group of households with more than one person and with 
only one income receiver (see Heerink 1994, pp. 199-206). 
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increase total income inequality (more precisely: ceteris paribus it would reduce the labour 
incomes versus the incomes stemming from interests; the latter incomes are distributed rela-
tively unequal).36 
 
b) Participation rates of different groups (especially of women) on labour market 
Expanding issue a) in this section, the actual group-specific labour force participation is ad-
dressed – especially the labour market participation of women. Dudel (2009), e. g., dis-
cussed connections between fertility and female labour market participation. On the basis of 
a model of projection for Germany until 2060, he found a “demographic dilemma”: A higher 
labour market participation of women would correspond with a lower fertility. Because of this, 
in the model the German population size will remarkably be reduced until 2060. This would 
have negative effects upon economic growth in the long run; contrary to this, in the short run 
the higher labour market participation of women would have positive growth effects. With 
respect to income inequality, changes of the labour market participation of women would 
have effects in dependence of the concrete household structures. For example, an increased 
labour market participation of single mothers would rather reduce than increase income ine-
quality by tendency. 
 
c) Group-specific unemployment (rates) 
The question of unemployment exhibits a close link with the question of social inequality: 
usually the degree of unemployment is positively correlated with (cross-sectional) income 
inequality (or with relative income poverty). At this, the distributional effects of short-term and 
long-term unemployment must be separated from each other. Mocan (1999) decomposed – 
assuming a stochastic trend – the US unemployment rate from 1970 to 1994 into a transitory 
and into a permanent term. Structural unemployment reduced the income shares of the lower 
60 % of the income distribution, and so it caused increases in (income) inequality; it in-
creased (income) inequality stronger than transitory, i. e. short-term unemployment. 
 
d) Age-earnings profiles 
Another source of demographically influenced labour market impacts on income distribution 
are demographically differentiated labour incomes; primarily, this means: age-earnings pro-
files.37 The empirically well-founded age-earnings profiles can be illustrated by human-capital 
theory.38 It can be argued that the most investments in human capital (education, on-the-job 
training, etc.) are typically done in young years of age. These investments require – in the 
sense of investment costs – reductions of labour incomes in young years of age, whereas 
the yields of such investments become important in later years of age. This fact leads to a 
positive connection between age and (labour) income which is reinforced by on-the-job train-
ing. Increasing human-capital investments lead to a steeper age-earnings profile. In later 
years of age depreciations as a consequence of physical and mental “deteriorations” must be 
considered as a contrast to the sketched increases so that the slope of the age-income pro-
files declines in these age areas.39 
The foregoing considerations dealt with age-earnings profiles in a longitudinal perspective. 
However, age-earnings profiles can also be considered in a cross-sectional way by referring 
to mean labour incomes of different age groups at a certain point of time – in contrast to the 
longitudinal perspective where for different cohorts the development of labour incomes over 
                                                            
36 See in this context Rodgers 1983, p. 443. 
37 By the way, age-earnings profiles are only in that sense an element of indirect distributional effects 
of (socio-)demography that the corresponding profiles reflect age-specific differences in productivity.  
38 See in this context the considerations of von Weizsäcker’s multifactorial model mentioned above. 
39 See Becker 1964 or Mincer 1974; see also Heerink 1994, pp. 178-179. 
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time is considered. Because of cyclical and secular trends with respect to the levels of labour 
incomes or with respect to the factors determining these levels, cross-sectional age-earnings 
profiles are different from longitudinal profiles.40 
Figure 6 shows that in a cross-sectional perspective an inverse U-shaped age-earnings con-
nection can arise despite increasing age-earnings profiles of the several cohorts (the latter 
means: in a longitudinal perspective). This difference results from longitudinal age-income 
profiles for the younger cohorts at a higher income level than for the older cohorts.41 Such 
inverse U-shaped age-related (labour-)income profiles are established in many cross-sec-
tional studies.42 
 
 
Figure 6: Exemplary age-related (labour-)income profiles in longitudinal 
               and cross-sectional perspective 
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Source: Author’s own illustration referring to Heerink 1994, p. 179 
                                                            
40 Heerink 1994, p. 181, provides some examples for cross-sectional age-income profiles. Concerning 
the generating of typically concave age-income profiles out of different determinants of the age-
specific productivity (experience, physique, basic skills like rhetoric, vocabulary, and the like) see e. g. 
Skirbekk 2008, pp. 194-195. Using US data 1975-1995, Feyrer 2008, pp. 88-90, in addition, showed 
that patented inventions are also distributed in a concave shape over individual ages (with maxima in 
the medium age classes between 40 and 50 years). 
41 In Figure 6 the youngest cohort is “cohort t”, and the oldest cohort is “cohort t-4”. 
42 See in this context e. g. the overview in Kessler and Pestieau 1994, pp. 16-17. See also the very 
pronounced elucidation of empirical age-earnings profiles for Norway 2000 in Almas, Havnes, and 
Mogstadt 2010, p. 4. 
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Schröder (2004) expects for Germany in the future that, because of the demographic 
change, the age-related (labour-)income profiles will be flatter than hitherto (especially in 
longitudinal perspective but also in a cross-sectional sense). Inter alia he reasons this with 
relative income losses of the older gainfully employed persons as a consequence of increas-
es in the cohorts‘ frequencies of those persons. Additionally, a potential change of age-
income profiles might be caused by a (possible further) increase of the pensionable age.43 
 
 
 
3.2.4 Capital market 
The demographically caused activities on the capital market primarily emerge from the ac-
cumulation of wealth over the individual life-cycle and from possible disequilibriums between 
supply and demand on the capital market. 
 
 
a) Life-cycle hypothesis  
Concerning private, age-dependent (dis-)saving processes and concerning the accumulation 
of wealth via capital market, in the economic theory typically the life-cycle hypothesis plays 
an important role (see Figure 7).44 It implies that an individual optimises his consumption (of 
goods and leisure time) over his entire lifetime so that his total utility over lifetime is maxim-
ised. In this context, in the literature some typical utility functions are supposed like a time-
separable CES utility function where the utility over lifetime depends on period-specific utility 
values. 
According to the life-cycle hypothesis, the private households smooth their consumption 
through variations of savings, concretely: through dissaving in the phases of education and 
retirement and through saving in the phase of employment. For example, in Figure 7 the in-
dividuals save between their 35th and their 65th year of age; otherwise individual dissaving 
occurs.45 
                                                            
43 See Schröder 2004, pp. 281-282. 
44 The life-cycle hypothesis stems from Ando and Modigliani 1963 (see also Ando and Modigliani 
1964). 
45 Obviously, in Figure 7 savings are defined as difference between income and consumption. Accord-
ing to the life-cycle hypothesis, total savings equal zero over the entire life-cycle. However, for Germa-
ny the life-cycle hypothesis has empirical deficiencies (see Gräf and Schattenberg 2006, pp. 17-19). 
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Figure 7: The life-cycle hypothesis (exemplary perspective) 
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Source: Faik 2009, p. 246 
 
 
 
b) Asset-meltdown hypothesis and structures on capital market 
A further important aspect concerning the connections between demography and capital 
markets is a reinforced use of capital markets e. g. because of institutional changes from a 
pay-as-you-go system towards capital covered schemes in the old-age security system. At a 
certain point of time such changes can lead to an increased number of assets’ sellers com-
pared with a reduced number of potential purchasers. This can cause reductions of assets’ 
prices and therefore of rates of return on assets (so-called “asset-meltdown hypothesis”). 
In the context of an international OLG model, Krueger and Ludwig (2006) stated that the 
USA probably will “import” the expected, more pronounced demographic changes of the oth-
er OECD countries; this can be interpreted as a counter-argument compared to the asset-
meltdown hypothesis.46 Also in an international view, the (age-dependent) degree of risk 
aversion and the stage of development of the capital markets are further important determi-
nants of the individual portfolios and, indirectly, of the distribution of capital incomes;47 these 
latter aspects can also counteract the asset-meltdown hypothesis. 
 
                                                            
46 See also Börsch-Supan 2008, pp. 68-72. 
47 See Rebeggiani 2007, p. 81. 
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3.2.5 Tax-transfer system 
In the context of the theme “Tax-transfer system” – in an exhaustive perspective – it is possi-
ble to distinguish between a) public and b) private (net) transfers. 
 
a) Tax system and public transfers 
In a comparative-static equilibrium’s model, von Weizsäcker only distinguished between two 
age groups: gainfully employed persons (in working age) and old-age pensioners. For both 
age groups income equations exist (in the sense of total net incomes); in this context, the 
old-age pensioners’ income shall fully equal the retirement benefits (= pensions) which shall 
be calculated on the basis of a pay-as-you-go system. Referring to the first two moments of a 
distribution, arithmetic mean and variance, the total income of the whole population can be 
decomposed into group-specific means and variances. Moreover, von Weizsäcker consid-
ered a tax and a public retirement system in his model. The inequality indicator he used was 
the squared coefficient of variation. Via partial differentiation of this inequality indicator with 
respect to the relevant variables von Weizsäcker obtained the corresponding inequality influ-
ences.48  
An important result of this model was that a higher population share of pensioners caused – 
supposing a balanced national budget – a reduction of (net) income inequality.49 This result 
referred back to the following assumptions: a) a higher share of gainfully employed persons 
compared with pensioners, b) a higher mean income of gainfully employed persons in com-
parison with pensioners, and c) a higher variance of gainfully employed persons’ incomes 
versus pensioners’ incomes. Moreover, a higher mean age of gainfully employed persons 
and a higher variance of the working age caused – in distinction from the factor “ratio of pen-
sioners and gainfully employed persons” (see above) – a higher income inequality.50 In this 
context, von Weizsäcker considered negative incentives for working, as a consequence of 
increased tax and contribution rates, as well as influences of the age structure on the age-
income profile.51 Variations of the demographic parameters in the model’s framework reveal 
a non-negligible weight of demography concerning measured inequality with an especially 
high importance of the indirect demographic effects.52 In Chapter 3.3 we will come back to 
this model. 
 
 
b) Private intergenerational transfers 
The question about private intergenerational transfers – particularly that means: inheritances 
and donations – is also important in this group of themes (concerning the distribution of 
wealth or of capital incomes). Whereas e. g. Schlomann (1990, 1992) or Szydlik (1999, 
2000) stated an accentuation of wealth inequality via inheritances, Westerheide (2005) ar-
gued that inheritances and donations would have levelling effects concerning wealth distribu-
tion because of a higher propensity to save, out of the received transfers, in the group of less 
wealthy households.53 
                                                            
48 See von Weizsäcker 1994a, pp. 35-80. 
49 In the context of Krueger and Ludwig‘s OLG model above sketched, it can be shown that the “signif-
icant” increase of income inequality in their basic model mainly rested upon an increase of the ratio of 
pensioners and gainfully employed persons; this is a contrary finding to von Weizsäcker’s result. See 
Krueger and Ludwig 2006, pp. 26-27. 
50 See von Weizsäcker 1994a, p. 44 and p. 50. 
51 See in this context especially von Weizsäcker 1994a, pp. 61-63. 
52 See von Weizsäcker 1994a, p. 76. 
53 See also Künemund 2010, pp. 8-10. 
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3.2.6 Application of incomes 
Since an individual income can be either consumed or saved, in the following a) individual 
consumption and saving patterns as determinants of the personal income inequality will 
shortly be discussed. Moreover, b) the question about income-dependent needs, as revealed 
in different equivalence scales over the entire income range, will be touched. 
 
a) Consumption and saving patterns 
Schröder discussed the old generation’s expenditure behaviour and its impact on intergener-
ational transfers as an indirect influence of demographic change upon income distribution 
and inequality.54 A (cohort-specifically) altered old generation’s expenditure behaviour to-
wards an enhanced consumption in old years of age can lead to a reduction of the amount of 
inheritances and donations; this can decrease inequality or, contrary to that, can – on the 
basis of Westerheide’s (2005) argumentation sketched in Section 3.2.5.b – increase inequali-
ty depending on the correlation between inheritances and donations on the one hand and 
income inequality on the other hand.55 
 
b) Income-dependent needs 
It seems plausible that the conversion of household incomes into household equivalent in-
comes requires variable, income-dependent equivalence scales; i. e.: the scale values 
should be smaller in the upper income area compared with the bottom income classes. The 
reason for this is that the adding of a further household member – e. g. of a child – only gen-
erates low additional costs (in percent) in the upper income area where the reference con-
sumption level (e. g. with respect to housing space) is high. This situation differs from the 
situation in the bottom income area where a low reference consumption level generates rela-
tively high corresponding additional costs (in percent). Further reasons for income-dependent 
equivalence scales might be larger price advantages – in the sense of discounts – or better 
possibilities for indebtedness in the upper compared with the bottom income area. 
If corresponding income-dependent equivalence scales are used, the differences of the 
equivalent incomes between both income areas will rise (ceteris paribus), and so (in a cross-
sectional perspective) also (equivalent) income inequality will probably increase.56 
 
 
 
3.2.7 Macroeconomic level 
On the macroeconomic level three central economic variables are important in the current  
context: a) inflation, b) business activity, and c) economic growth. 
 
a) Inflation 
In Mocan‘s (1999) analysis – for US data from the 1970s to the mid-1990s – inflation had a 
progressive influence on the measured income inequality and on its changes over time; rea-
sonably this was only valid for inflation which was not anticipated. A non-anticipated inflation 
can influence e. g. the distributional relations between gainfully employed persons and pen-
                                                            
54 See Schröder 2004, pp. 280-285. 
55 Divergent consumption and saving patterns as consequences of different age compositions in an 
economy and their impact on the (functional) income distribution and on economic growth were Rada’s 
(2009) focus in the context of her Keynesian Kaldor model. 
56 See in this context Faik 2010, pp. 23-27. 
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sioners or the relations between the receivers of capital versus labour income. Because of 
the age-related discrepancies between gainfully employed persons and pensioners and be-
cause of lifetime cyclicality of the individual stock of wealth, one obtains cross connections 
between inflation and demography. 
 
b) Business activity 
Concerning the connections between business activity and personal income distribution, the 
above discussed variable unemployment is an important intermediate variable. In a reces-
sion, typically, (cyclical) unemployment is higher than in a boom; this increases inequality. 
However, opposed to the development during booms (when usually profits rise faster than 
labour incomes), in a recession the ratio of profits and labour incomes is typically lower which 
points to an inequality decreasing effect of recessions. Until now, dependencies of cyclical 
effects on demography are not completely clear. In a more elaborated consideration, e. g. it 
ought to be analysed whether cyclically caused unemployment is rather a phenomenon of 
young persons or rather one of old persons in an economy. 
 
c) Economic growth 
With respect to economic growth, Jäntti and Jenkins (2009) stated that – on the basis of the 
Gini coefficient – for Great Britain a low economic growth would hardly produce any change 
of inequality, whereas a high economic growth would generate increases of inequality. In 
some sense this contrasts to “Kuznet’s curve”57 which postulates a U-shaped connection 
between the amount of total income per capita and income inequality.58 The connections 
between growth and personal income inequality are partly caused by demographic effects. 
Assuming decreasing factor productivities of the older work force, e. g. a negative connection 
between demography and growth would be plausible. On such a basis the interplay between 
growth and income inequality can principally be analysed. 
 
 
3.3 A model embracing the relations between socio-demography 
      and income inequality 
Von Weizsäcker (1993) developed a simple model concerning the interplay between demo-
graphic change, public finance, individual reactions of adaption, and personal income distri-
bution in an analytically closed form which was already sketched in Section 3.2.5.59 This 
model deals with direct as well with indirect (socio-)demographic influences on the personal 
income distribution. The inequality indicator, von Weizsäcker used, was the squared coeffi-
cient of variation V2 = 2/2 [: income standard deviation, : arithmetic mean value of in-
comes]. 
The model’s starting point is the segregation of the population into the groups of gainfully 
employed persons and of pensioners; summing up their incomes, gives the society’s income. 
                                                            
57 See Kuznets 1955. 
58 See also Rebeggiani 2007, p. 132. 
59 The following considerations refer to von Weizsäcker 1993, pp. 5- 87. 
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For a gainfully employed person j in a specific working period n, the (linear) age-income pro-
file is: 
(15)   jnjnjnjnjnj N,...,0nTESZRBAY   
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[Ynj: net income of the gainfully employed person j in (working) period n, Anj: gross labour 
income of the gainfully employed person j in (working) period n, RBnj: contribution to the re-
tirement system of the gainfully employed person j in (working) period n, SZnj: tax payment of 
the gainfully employed person j in (working) period n, TEnj: transfer income of the gainfully 
employed person j in (working) period n, n = 0: entrance into working life, n = Nj: exit out of 
working life, t: tax rate, c: contribution rate to the retirement system, T: lump-sum transfer, aj 
= A0j: initial income, bj = An+1,j – Anj: growth of income]. 
The mean net income of gainfully employed persons‘ cohort n results in: 
(16)  
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Thus, the mean net income of all gainfully employed persons Y is the sum of mean incomes 
of all gainfully employed persons’ cohorts weighted by the corresponding relative frequencies 
h(n) = JY (n)/JY [JY(n): number of gainfully employed persons in cohort n, JY: number of gain-
fully employed persons]: 
(17)  
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[m: mean age of gainfully employed persons]. 
The income of a pensioner i shall be: 
(18)  iiii TESZBPP   
         0L,1p0
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
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[Pi: net pension of pensioner i, BPi: gross pension of pensioner i, SZi: tax payments of pen-
sioner i, TEi: transfers additionally to the gross pension of pensioner i, p: rate of pension 
payments (controlled by state), A: mean gross labour income of the gainfully employed per-
sons, Li: personal assessment basis of pensioner i]. 
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Resulting from a simplification of Equation (18), SZi equals zero; i. e. that the pensions are 
not taxed. Furthermore and obviously, a dynamisation of pensions is assumed on the basis 
of the mean gross labour incomes (µA). 
Considering the mean pension payments P = p A L, society’s mean income  can be de-
rived as: 
(19)  
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JP reflects the number of pensioners, and JP/JY is the ratio of old and young persons or – 
more precisely: – of pensioners and gainfully employed persons. 
Beneath the mean income , the income standard deviation  (or the income variance 2) is, 
as is well-known, decisive for the calculation of the squared coefficient of variation V2. In this 
context the income variance of the gainfully employed persons in cohort n is: 
(20)  
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In the foregoing expression the covariance between a and b – with assumed equal values for 
a and b in each cohort – must be considered because the initial income and the growth rate 
of incomes are not independent of each other: empirically, a negative correlation between 
both variables was observed in many cases. 
On the basis of Equation (20), the income variance of all gainfully employed persons can be 
decomposed into a within-group element (first term in the first row of Equation (21)) and into 
a between-group component (second term in the first row of Equation (21)): 
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[s2: variance of working age]. 
Obviously, the stronger the individual initial incomes and the growth rates of income vary and 
the smaller the (negative) correlation between these two variables is, the larger the income 
dispersion within the group of gainfully employed persons is. Whereas the life-cycle variable 
b is directly connected with age composition, this is not the case for the initial variables a. 
The reason for this difference can be seen by Equation (21) because the effects of 2b and 
cov(a,b) are, different from the effect of 2a, influenced by the age structure of gainfully em-
ployed persons. 
Expression (21) yields, considering the pensioners‘ income variance 2P (= p2 2A 2L), the 
societal income variance. In this context, the first two terms in Equation (22) represent the 
within-group dispersions, and the last term in Equation (22) reflects the between-group dis-
persion: 
(22)        .x1xx1x 2PY2P2Y2    
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In a next step, the tax system is introduced as well as the retirement system (as a pay-as-
you-go system); the accounting equations are: 
(23)      
    
  
    


N
0n
)n(J
1j
N
0n
)n(J
1j
nj
N
0n
)n(J
1j
J
1i
inj
N
0n
)n(J
1j
J
1i
inj
YY
Y PY P
TAc1t
TETESZSZ
           (tax system)60 
and 
(24)   
 
 
 


PY
PY
J
1i
i
N
0n
)n(J
1j
nj
J
1i
i
N
0n
)n(J
1j
nj
PAc
BPRB
               (retirement system). 
The contribution rate of the retirement system cGG equals in the equilibrium: 
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it is the product of the ratio of the old and the young on the one hand and the relative aver-
age level of pensions on the other hand. Partial differentiation yields positive dependences of 
cGG with respect to p and L, and a negative dependence on x. 
In the equilibrium, the tax rate tGG is: 
(26)  
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The tax rate in the equilibrium depends positively on T, p, and L; moreover, it depends 
negatively on m, x, a, and b. 
In von Weizsäcker’s model an interaction between the contribution rate to the retirement sys-
tem in the equilibrium and the tax rate in the equilibrium exists, as becomes obvious through 
the first row of Equation (26). This interaction leads to a dependence of the tax rate in the 
equilibrium on characteristics of the pensioners (JP, p, and L) although the pensions are not 
taxed. The fiscal deductibility of the contributions to the retirement system causes a function-
al dependence of the minimum income guaranteed T on the financing of the pensions. If e. g. 
the number of pensioners JP increases (or, equivalently, if x decreases), the contribution rate 
to the retirement system in the equilibrium cGG increases, and this reduces the incomes of the 
gainfully employed persons which are subject to income tax. Thus, the fiscal revenue of the 
state decreases which requires an increasing tax rate in the equilibrium tGG (in order to guar-
                                                            
60 As mentioned above, the pensions are not taxed so that the pensioners do not pay taxes. 
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antee the balance of the public budget). So the tax rate in the equilibrium tGG rises if JP in-
creases (and the same holds true for p and L). 
The (mean) income of the gainfully employed persons, known from Equation (17), must be 
modified because of the sketched connections between tax and retirement system: 
(17a)    ,11, 
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so that the above Equation (19) for the societal income changes to: 
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The (equilibrium’s) income in Equation (19a) is independent of all policy parameters because 
all charges “come back” to the population. 
Equation (21), which corresponds with the gainfully employed persons, must be modified as 
follows: 
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which means for Equation (23) (and for the entire population): 
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In order to solve the model analytically (to a high extent) von Weizsäcker meets the following 
three (empirically resilient) assumptions (as already mentioned in Section 3.2.5): 
1. JY > JP (or x > ½), i. e.: there are more gainfully employed persons than pensioners; 
2. Y > P, i. e.: the mean income of the gainfully employed persons is higher than that 
of the pensioners; 
3. 2Y > 2P, i. e.: the income dispersion of the gainfully employed persons is higher than 
that of the pensioners. 
Differentiating the squared coefficient of variation with respect to x, yields (in the sense of the 
total derivative): 
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In the first row of Equation (27) the first term represents the direct influence of x on the 
squared coefficient of variation; in von Weizsäcker’s model it is negative. In the second term 
in the first row of Equation (27) both mathematical factors are negative so that their product 
is positive. The latter is also valid for the third term in the first row of Equation (27). All in all, 
some evidence (including empirical evidence) suggests that the influence of x on the squared 
coefficient of variation is positive. Thus, a higher population share of pensioners reduces 
income inequality.61 
It is possible to refine von Weizsäcker’s model (microeconomically) inter alia through the 
consideration of individual avoiding strategies or reactions concerning governmental activi-
ties or through an assumed dependence of the individual income profile on the age structure 
of the entire population. Qualitatively, such new operationalizations cause no changes com-
pared with the inequality dependences sketched above, as was shown by von Weizsäcker. 
In my opinion von Weizsäcker’s approach at least has the following deficiencies: 
 the missing of capital incomes, 
 an only rudimentary reproduction of the German tax system, 
 the confinement of the social security system on a public retirement system, 
 the neglecting of the household context, 
 the reduced model structure, i. e. the missing microeconomic foundation of the model, 
 the comparative-static character of the model, 
 missing feedbacks of the distribution and of the accrual of incomes upon demograph-
ic variables like e. g. fertility, and 
 the operationalization of the age-income profiles as linear functions. 
 
 
4. Shift-share and decomposition analyses concerning the connection 
     between demography and income inequality 
In many cases, comparative-static analyses of incidence concerning the influence of demog-
raphy on income inequality were accomplished. At this, the population structure of a base 
year was assumed to be constant, and through the corresponding differences to the inequali-
ty values with variable, actual population shares the demographic inequality influence was 
derived. This simplified, so-called “shift-share approach”62 implies that changes in the popula-
tion structure do not affect the degree of inequality within the subgroups and also not the 
differences in mean incomes between the several subgroups. 
An older shift-share analysis for Great Britain stems from Semple (1975). He analysed chan-
ges in household composition with respect to gross and net income distribution. Whereas for 
the Britain gross income distribution 1961-1973 inequality was reduced over time by changes 
in household composition, concerning net income distribution Semple stated no substantial 
changes.63 
Also in 1975 Danziger and Plotnick explored, for the period of time between 1965 and 1972 
and on the basis of microeconomic US data of the Survey of Economic Opportunity (SEO) 
                                                            
61 Another differentiation in von Weizsäcker’s model leads to the constellation that a longer mean 
working time as well as a higher dispersion of working time increase income inequality. 
62 Concerning the concept of shift-share analysis see e. g. Dinwiddy and Reed 1977, pp. 115-120. 
63 See Semple 1975, p. 102. 
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from 1966 and the Current Population Survey (CPS) from March 1973, the influence of 
(twelve) socio-demographic subgroups on the pre-transfer and the post-transfer distribution 
of incomes. The inequality indicator they used was the Gini coefficient. With respect to the 
corresponding (socio-)demographic influences on the pre-transfer and the post-transfer dis-
tribution of incomes the authors wrote: “Both of these estimates suggest that about one-half 
of the observed 6.3 percent increase in the Gini coefficient from .4400 in 1965 to .4679 in 
1972 cannot be accounted for by demographic change.“64 
Like Semple (1975) and also for Great Britain on the basis of a shift-share analysis, Dinwiddy 
and Reed (1977) analysed four factors: 1. changes in the patterns and in the extent of mar-
riages, 2. changes in the population share of old persons, 3. changes in the population 
shares of full-time pupils and students, and 4. changes in female labour market participation. 
Whereas the first three factors increased inequality (weakly), the opposite was the case for 
the fourth factor. 
Mookherjee and Shorrocks‘ (1982) decomposition approach showed that – for Great Britain 
1965-1980 – changes in the age structure were not very relevant for explaining the Britain 
(gross) income inequality in the period of time mentioned.65 They concluded – via the indica-
tor mean logarithmic deviation – that the stated increase of the measured inequality was pri-
marily the result of a stronger concavity of the age-income profiles – especially a conse-
quence of increased female working participation rates –, and to a lower extent it depended 
on changes in inequality within the several age groups.66 
By another decomposition analysis – again on the basis of the inequality indicator mean log-
arithmic deviation – Heerink (1994) explored the effects of age and sex on the individual in-
come inequality in a monography which principally dealt with aspects of economic develop-
ment. He decomposed the mean logarithmic deviation into a between-group and into a with-
in-group component. In the context of economic development the age effect can have two 
opposite effects on individual income inequality. On the one hand it can become more im-
portant if human-capital investments rise; this is positively connected with economic devel-
opment and probably leads to steeper age-income profiles and to more income inequality. 
On the other hand the population shares of young population groups typically decrease with 
a rising degree of economic development so that their weights and at the same time the rela-
tive importance of their comparatively low incomes decrease; this reduces inequality. Empiri-
cally, it was shown that the absolute amount of the age effect increased with a rising degree 
of economic development. Furthermore, there was empirical evidence that sex-related in-
come differences were not unimportant concerning a country’s individual income inequality.67 
Harding (1994) elicited the influences of several socio-demographic variables upon the Aus-
tralian (gross) income distribution in 1990 by alternatively using the socio-demographic struc-
tures of the years 1982 and 1993 as basis for comparisons. She kept the economic variables 
of influence constant. The inequality indicator she used was the Gini coefficient. In her analy-
sis the personal market income distribution, the personal gross income distribution (i. e. the 
distribution of market incomes plus transfers), and the personal gross equivalent income dis-
tribution were separated from each other. The used equivalence scale was derived out of the 
Australian literature. As one result, the ageing process observed between 1982 and 1993 
only had marginal inequality impacts. In contrast, changes in family structures (towards sin-
gle-person households and towards couples without children) seemed to have comparatively 
large inequality increasing effects. Changes in the female labour market participation had 
inequality reducing effects with respect to the Australian gross equivalent income distribution 
between 1982 and 1990 (in some contrast to the changes of the male labour market partici-
pation rates which only had a very marginal influence on income inequality). Between 1990 
                                                            
64 Danziger and Plotnick 1975, p. 8. 
65 See Mookherjee and Shorrocks 1982, p. 901. 
66 See Mookherjee and Shorrocks 1982, p. 898. 
67 See Heerink 1994, pp. 182-194. 
34 
 
and 1993 there existed, in contrast, no noteworthy inequality effects of changes in the female 
labour market participation rates in Australia. 
Jenkins (1995) showed that changes in the population shares of different household types 
had no substantial influence on the measured changes of (net equivalent) income inequality 
in Great Britain between 1971 and 1986. He decomposed the income inequality into different 
population subgroups on the one hand and into different kinds of income on the other hand, 
and he referred to the mean logarithmic deviation and the normalised coefficient of variation 
as decomposable inequality indicators. The population’s breakdown into subgroups revealed 
a markedly larger influence of within-group inequality compared with between-group inequali-
ty. 
Karoly and Burtless (1995) analysed changes on labour market and in household composi-
tion and their impacts on the income distribution measured by changes of the Gini coefficient 
in the context of a decomposition approach. Increasing labour market participation rates of 
female household heads caused an inequality reduction – for the USA in a 30-years period 
since 1959. The most important demographic factor appeared to be the reduction of house-
hold sizes which corresponded with an increase of inequality (especially in the 1970s). How-
ever, influences coming from the labour market were quantitatively more important. 
Lerman (1996) tried to find out the influences of altered family structures on the poverty of 
children and on income inequality for the USA 1971-1989. In this context simulation studies 
showed that the trend towards reduced numbers of marriages was responsible for more than 
half of increased income inequality. This was caused by two transmission channels: on the 
one hand by the direct effect of smaller households (with only one or two income receivers) 
and on the other hand by indirect effects. These latter effects e. g. emerged from larger in-
centives to work for married men than for non-married men (towards better paid jobs, etc.).68  
Bishop, Formby, and Smith (1997) compared – on the basis of a regression analysis – the 
distribution of family incomes in the USA 1976-1989, measured by a socio-demographically 
adjusted Gini coefficient (analogous to Paglin’s approach sketched at the beginning of the 
paper), with the corresponding distribution which was measured by a non-adjusted, cross-
sectional Gini coefficient. As socio-demographic variables they used age, race, sex, and ed-
ucational level. They showed that the measured increase of inequality at the end of the peri-
od of observation depended less on age and race and more on sex and educational level. 
Jäntti (1997) measured – on the basis of cross-sectional LIS data (LIS = Luxembourg Income 
Study) – the influence of demographic trends on income inequality for several countries; he 
analysed different age groups within identical household types. Furthermore, Jäntti examined 
the inequality effects of the number of gainfully employed persons within a household. He 
concluded that changes in age structure as well as changes in household composition would 
only have a weak influence on the measured income inequality in countries in which the ine-
quality increases. Another finding was that the inequality within the considered demographic 
groups (and in a few cases also between those groups) rose. Normally, the growth of the 
household head’s labour income inequality was the largest “driver” of changes of inequality. 
Similarly, Burtless (1999) found that changes in labour income inequality had the strongest 
impact on changes of the overall income inequality. Pure demographic influences were re-
sponsible for approximately one-quarter of the inequality increase observed from 1979 to 
1996 in the USA. 
Daly and Royer (2000) analysed Californian booms from the end of the 1960s to the end of 
the 1990s concerning changes of socio-demographic influences on changes of the inequality 
of household gross equivalent incomes – in comparison with the rest of the USA. By a shift-
share analysis they found that socio-demographic factors accounted for between one-third 
and one-half of the corresponding regional differences. 
                                                            
68 See Lerman 1996, pp. S119-S120.  
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An analysis for Australia 1982-1998 made by Johnson and Wilkins (2003) showed that 
changes in household composition contributed to the measured increases of market income 
inequality in the amount between one-fifth and one-quarter. The effects of altered household 
structures were approximately counterbalanced by changes of the Australian age structure, 
of the population share of foreigners, and of educational levels. Along Jenkins’ (1995) lines, 
Johnson and Wilkins (2003) also found that changes in the working status accounted for 
more than half of the measured inequality increase. 
In a further shift-share analysis for Australia, concerning the years 1994/95 until 2002/03, Li 
(2005) stated that changes in all demographic factors together were decisive for approxi-
mately one-third of the entire increase of income inequality (in the amount of 2.3 %). 
According to the results of Daly and Valletta’s (2006) study, in the USA from 1969 to 1998 
demographic influences caused maximally one-quarter of the observed inequality increases. 
Daly and Valletta used the equivalent household income and in this context Buhmann et al.’s 
equivalence scale operationalized by an exponent in the amount of the square root of 
household size69.70 They explicitly noted that in the USA, contrasting to Jenkins’ above stated 
findings for Great Britain, changes in family structures would have been quite substantial with 
respect to the observed inequality changes.71 
Muniz (2008) examined in the context of a decomposition analysis, which was strongly dif-
ferent from the shift-share analyses here otherwise considered, how the population shares 
and the income shares of the poor, the middle-class, and the rich in Brasilia in 1980, 1991, 
and 2000 did change and how changes did affect income inequality. His analysis showed 
that the largest fraction of total income inequality (family income per capita) could be as-
cribed to between-group variations of the population shares; more than 60 % of total ine-
quality was dedicated to a “class effect”. 
Burtless‘ (2009) analysis showed that in the USA between 1979 and 2004 demographic 
changes could explain only a rather small fraction of the measured changes of inequality. 
85 % of the observed increases of the Gini coefficient would have occurred even if the de-
mographic structure would have been constant.72 
In the context of a further decomposition analysis – on the basis of the inequality indicator 
mean logarithmic deviation and of the German database Sozioökonomisches Panel (SOEP) 
– Peichl, Pestel, and Schneider (2009) investigated the influence of changes in household 
structure on the development of the German income inequality. 
 
 
                                                            
69 This operationalization of Buhmann et al.‘s equivalence scale has the following appearance:  10Smh    with  = 0.5 (mh: equivalence scale value, S: household size, : parameter 
representing economies of scale; see Buhmann et al. 1988, p. 119). 
70 See Daly and Valletta 2006, pp. 76-77. 
71 See Daly and Valletta 2006, p. 95. 
72 See Burtless 2009, pp. 445-446. 
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Excursus: The decomposition of the variation of the mean logarithmic deviation 
The variation of the mean logarithmic deviation (MLD) over time – in the sense of the differ-
ence of MLD at the points of time t+1 and t – can be decomposed, principally, in four terms 
(an overbar over a variable or over a mathematical expression denotes the average of values 
at the points of time t and t+1):73 
(28)
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[MLD: entire mean logarithmic deviation, MLDg: mean logarihmic deviation within group of 
persons g, μ: overall arithmic mean of incomes, μg: arithmetic mean of incomes within group 
of persons g, vg: group-specific income share, wg: group-specific population share]. 
Term A reflects the influence of intertemporal changes with respect to within-group inequali-
ty, term B represents changes in within-group inequality which refer to changes of the popu-
lation shares, term C indicates the influence of changes of the population shares on be-
tween-group inequality, and term D characterises relative changes of the mean group-
specific incomes and their impact on overall inequality changes.74 
Summarising the foregoing characterisations, 
 term A is an expression for within-group inequality which is generated by different 
characteristics within the groups (these characteristics must be different from the 
group-constituting characteristics), 
 terms B and C represent the demographic component of inequality change, 
 and term D reflects the influence of changes in the distribution of the group-specific 
mean incomes.75 
End of excursus 
 
Using a corresponding decomposition approach, Peichl, Pestel, and Schneider (2009) empir-
ically stated that the German changes in inequality between 1991 and 2003 were mainly 
generated by changes within the several population groups. Demographic factors enforced 
temporary rises of income inequality or decelerated temporary declines of income inequality; 
they were quite important with respect to the level of inequality, and they were more im-
portant for the inequality of household gross equivalent incomes than for the distribution of 
household net equivalent incomes. This points to the conjecture that the German tax-transfer 
                                                            
73 See also Faik 2010, pp. 9-10. 
74 Basically, see in this context Mookherjee and Shorrocks 1982; see also Rodrigues 1993, p. 9, or 
Peichl, Pestel, and Schneider 2009, pp. 7-9. 
75 See Peichl, Pestel, and Schneider 2009, pp. 8-9. 
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system compensates, at least partly, inequality effects which are caused through altered 
household structures. Moreover, the inequality increases caused by demographic factors in 
periods with a rather small change of inequality were very effective. The authors interpreted 
their findings in such a way “(…) that the demographic changes affect income inequality 
permanently, whereas other influences only selectively have a large influence through busi-
ness cycles or other overall economic shocks and push back the demographic components 
in their relevance only temporarily.”76 
Last but not least, Almas, Havnes, and Mogstadt (2010) dealt with the effects of the ”baby 
boom” in Norway upon the measured (labour) income inequality between 1967 and 2004. 
They referred to Paglin’s (1975) basic approach insofar as they used an age-adjusted Gini 
coefficient for measuring inequality. Through this, a slight increase of inequality occured 
compared with the “classical” Gini coefficient which is not age-adjusted. 
By the way, Almas and Mogstadt (2009) also applied their ”new” Gini coefficient to the per-
sonal wealth distribution in several countries on the database of the Luxembourg Wealth 
Study (LWS). Like Almas, Havnes, and Mogstadt’s (2010) study above mentioned, an age-
adjusted Gini coefficient and, additionally, a multivariate regression’s model were used. On 
this basis, the age effects were derived supposing constancy of other wealth determinants. 
Compared with the “classical” Gini coefficient, the age-adjusted Gini coefficient did not pro-
duce another ranking of the countries analysed with respect to their inequality of wealth. De-
spite their preference for age-adjusted reassessments of income and wealth inequality, Al-
mas and Mogstadt concluded that, in this special case concerning wealth, age-adjustments 
did not play a major role.77 
It is difficult to compare the findings of the studies above sketched. This is because the data 
used and, mainly, the operationalizations applied differ strongly from each other. For exam-
ple, this holds true for the operationalization of the income variables (individual income, 
household gross income, household net income, or household equivalent income) or for the 
choice of the inequality indicator (e. g. Gini coefficient versus mean logarithmic deviation ver-
sus normalised coefficient of variation). A common result of many studies is, in a qualitative 
manner, that demographically induced inequality variations are especially effective if the 
measured inequality variation is comparatively small. In times of peace demographic influ-
ences primarily play a role in a long-term perspective.78 This statement must be restricted 
insofar as in many studies above discussed merely the direct demographic effects upon in-
come inequality were measured and not the – probably more important – indirect demo-
graphic effects. 
As a synopsis, the several studies of this chapter are presented in Table 1. The criterions to 
compare the different studies are the area of investigation (differentiated into region and into 
years of observation), the operationalization of the variables used (welfare and inequality 
indicator, and socio-demographic variables), and the results of the several studies. 
 
                                                            
76 Peichl, Pestel, and Schneider 2009, p. 21 (author’s own translation from German into English). 
77 See Almas and Mogstadt 2009, p. 20. 
78 See Burtless 2009, pp. 452-453. 
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Table 1: Synopsis of (shift-share) studies with respect to the connections 
              between socio-demography and inequality of welfare 
Study Region(s) Years of 
observa-
tion 
Welfare 
variable(s) 
Inequality 
indicator(s) 
Socio-
demograph-
ic variable(s) 
Results 
Semple 
(1975) 
Great 
Britain 
1961-1973 Household 
gross and 
household 
net income 
Gini coeffi-
cient 
 
Household 
structure 
Changes of household structures 
generate reductions of gross 
income inequality, but they have 
no large effect on household net 
income. 
Danziger 
and 
Plotnick 
(1975) 
USA 1965, 1972 Gross in-
come 
Gini coeffi-
cient 
12 socio-
demographic 
groups 
50 % of the increases of inequali-
ty between 1965 and 1972 have 
socio-demographic causes. 
Dinn-
widdy 
and 
Reed 
(1977) 
Great 
Britain 
1951 versus 
1971/72 
and 
1972/73 
Household 
gross in-
come 
Gini coeffi-
cient 
1. Changes in 
patterns/ 
extent of 
marriages, 
2. changes in 
population 
share of old 
people,  
3. changes in 
population 
share of full-
time pupils/ 
students, 
4. changes in 
female labour 
market parti-
cipation 
The factors 1-3 (weakly) increase 
inequality, factor 4 reduces 
inequality. 
 
Mook-
herjee 
and 
Shor-
rocks 
(1982) 
Great 
Britain 
1965-1980 Gross in-
come 
Mean loga-
rithmic devia-
tion 
Age struc-
ture, female 
labour market 
participation 
Inequality increases as a conse-
quence of changes in the female 
labour market participation and, 
corresponding with this, because 
of a higher concavity of the age-
income profiles. Weaker inequali-
ty effects stem from changes in 
the within-group inequalities of 
the several age groups. 
Heerink 
(1994) 
Several 
countries 
with a 
different 
status of 
economic 
develop-
ment 
Several 
years, 
especially 
1970s and 
1980s 
Individual 
income (also 
household 
gross in-
come) 
Mean loga-
rithmic devia-
tion 
Age struc-
ture, sex, 
household 
size 
The absolute amount of the age 
effect – in terms of a steeper 
age-income profile correspond-
ing with a higher degree of eco-
nomic development – increases 
with a higher degree of economic 
development; the variable sex is 
relevant for inequality. 
Harding 
(1994) 
Australia 1982-1993 Market, 
gross, and 
gross equiv-
alent income 
Gini coeffi-
cient 
Household 
composition, 
age structure, 
sex-specific 
labour market 
participation 
Changes of household structures 
reduce inequality. The inequality 
effects of ageing and of changes 
in male labour market participa-
tion are only weak. Changes in 
female labour market participa-
tion decrease inequality between 
1982 and 1990, but they are not 
very relevant for inequality be-
tween 1990 and 1993. 
Jenkins 
(1995) 
Great 
Britain 
1971-1986 Household 
net equiva-
lent income 
Mean loga-
rithmic devia-
tion, normal-
ised coeffi-
cient of varia-
tion 
Household 
type 
There is no relevant inequality 
influence of household types. 
The within-group inequality is 
more important than the be-
tween-group inequality. 
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(Table 1 continued:) 
Study Region(s) Years of 
observa-
tion 
Welfare 
variable(s) 
Inequality 
indicator(s) 
Socio-
demograph-
ic variable(s) 
Results 
Karoly 
and 
Burtless 
(1995) 
USA 30 years 
since 1959 
Household 
net equiva-
lent income 
Gini coeffi-
cient 
Household 
size, house-
hold compo-
sition, sex-
specific 
labour market 
participation, 
etc. 
The trend towards smaller 
households increases inequality. 
Labour market effects are more 
important for inequality than 
demographic variables are. 
Lerman 
(1996) 
USA 1971-1989 Household 
net equiva-
lent income 
Gini coeffi-
cient 
Family struc-
ture 
Reduced marriage numbers 
explain around 50 % of in-
creased income inequality. This 
results from smaller households 
and from stronger incentives to 
work for married men compared 
with non-married men. 
Bishop,  
Formby, 
and 
Smith 
(1997) 
USA 1976-1989 Family net 
income 
Original and 
socio-
demographi-
cally adjusted 
Gini coeffi-
cient 
Age, race, 
sex, educa-
tion 
The age effect is more important 
than the race effect concerning 
income inequality. Furthermore, 
the impacts of sex and education 
are more important than the age 
and the race effect with respect 
to inequality increases over time. 
Jäntti 
(1997) 
Several 
countries 
(LIS data-
base) 
1980s Household 
net equiva-
lent income 
Gini coeffi-
cient, mean 
logarithmic 
deviation, 
squared 
coefficient of 
variation 
Age struc-
ture, house-
hold type, 
number of 
gainfully 
employed 
persons per 
household 
In case of a decline of inequality 
only a small inequality influence 
of changes in the age and 
household structure becomes 
evident. The inequality of labour 
incomes (of household heads) is 
an important cause for total 
income inequality.  
Burtless 
(1999) 
USA 1979-1996 Household 
net equiva-
lent labour 
income 
Gini coeffi-
cient, rela-
tions of dec-
iles 
Different 
household 
types 
The inequality of labour incomes 
is the most important income-
related factor concerning total 
income inequality. Demographic 
variables account for around ¼ 
of the observed inequality in-
crease. 
Daly and 
Royer 
(2000) 
California 
(USA) 
(Mainly) 
1969, 1979, 
1989 und 
1998 
Household 
gross equiv-
alent income 
Gini coeffi-
cient, rela-
tions of dec-
iles 
Age, race, 
education, 
etc. 
Socio-demographic and cyclical 
effects play a major role concern-
ing the stronger inequality in-
crease in California compared 
with the rest of the USA. Demo-
graphic influences are responsi-
ble for one-third up to one-half of 
the corresponding differences. 
Johnson 
and  
Wilkens 
(2003) 
Australia 1982-1998 Market 
income (on 
household 
level) 
Gini coeffi-
cient, Theil 
indicator, 
coefficient of 
variation, 
relations of 
deciles 
Household 
composition, 
population 
share of 
foreigners, 
age structure, 
education, 
working 
status 
Changes of the working status 
account for more than half of the 
increase of inequality; changes 
of household composition consti-
tute a fraction between one-fifth 
and one-quarter of inequality of 
market incomes. This effect is 
approximately counterbalanced 
by changes of age structure, of 
population share of foreigners, 
and of educational levels. 
Li (2005) Australia 1994/95 
versus 
2002/03 
Household 
net equiva-
lent income 
Gini coeffi-
cient 
Age struc-
ture, sex, 
working 
status, place 
of residence 
All demographic factors together 
account for around one-third of 
the increase of income inequality 
(+ 2.3 %). 
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(Table 1 continued:) 
Study Region(s) Years of 
observa-
tion 
Welfare 
variable(s) 
Inequality 
indicator(s) 
Socio-
demograph-
ic variable(s) 
Results 
Daly and 
Valletta 
(2006) 
USA 1969-1998 Household 
net equiva-
lent income 
Gini coeffi-
cient, Theil 
indicator, 
coefficient of 
variation, 
relations of 
deciles, mean 
logarithmic 
deviation 
Family struc-
ture 
Demographic influences are 
responsible for maximally ¼ of 
the inequality increase. 
Muniz 
(2008) 
Brasilia 1980, 1991, 
2000 
Family 
income per 
capita 
Gini coeffi-
cient, Theil 
indicator, 
mean loga-
rithmic devia-
tion 
Population 
(and income) 
shares of 
bottom, 
middle, and 
upper (in-
come) class 
Changes in population shares 
are very important for changes in 
between-group inequality. 
Burtless 
(2009) 
USA 1979-2004 Household 
net equiva-
lent income 
Gini coeffi-
cient 
Age of 
household 
head, house-
hold type 
Demographic changes only 
cause a small fraction of ine-
quality changes. 
Peichl, 
Pestel, 
and 
Schnei-
der 
(2009) 
Germany 1991-2003 Household 
gross equiv-
alent in-
come, 
household 
net equiva-
lent income 
Mean loga-
rithmic devia-
tion 
Household 
structure 
The within-group component is 
more important than the be-
tween-group component. De-
mography enforces temporary 
inequality increases (and decel-
erates temporary inequality 
reductions). At this, demography 
is more important for the inequal-
ity of household gross equivalent 
incomes than for the household 
net equivalent incomes. Above 
all, demography is most relevant 
at small changes of inequality. 
Almas 
and 
Mog-
stadt 
(2009) 
Several 
countries 
(LWS 
database) 
1999-2002 Wealth (per 
capita) 
Original and 
age-adjusted 
Gini coeffi-
cient 
Age structure There are no noteworthy differ-
ences between the modified and 
the original Gini coefficient. 
Almas,  
Havnes, 
and 
Mog-
stadt 
(2010) 
Norway 1967-2004 Household 
labour in-
come 
Original and 
age-adjusted 
Gini coeffi-
cient 
Age structure The modified Gini coefficient 
indicates a stronger inequality 
increase than the original Gini 
coefficient. 
Source: Author’s own composition 
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
Demographic variables can influence the personal income inequality directly and indirectly. 
Indirectly, transmission channels are the labour market, the capital market, the tax-transfer 
system, the application of incomes, and the macroeconomic level. Former shift-share anal-
yses found in the literature revealed a rather medium influence of demography on measured 
income inequality (in a cross-sectional perspective). However, in these studies the indirect 
demographic effects were often excluded. The comprehensive modeling of such indirect de-
mographic effects, e. g. in the context of an OLG model, is a challenge for the future. 
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Furthermore, longitudinal aspects of the income distribution should be considered in a more 
exhaustive way as was done so far because in empirical longitudinal studies, beneath an 
increase of income variance with rising age in the several cohorts, a permanent increase of 
the average absolute (labour) income with rising age was found.79 Now the question is 
whether lifetime (labour) incomes – i. e. the present values of the individual period (labour) 
incomes – are distributed more equally or more unequally than the incomes per period. 
The previous question cannot be answered terminally because – even in an empirical analy-
sis – such a comparison depends on the income development of the younger cohorts (as 
Krupp stated). Since the biographies of former cohorts cannot fully serve as an indicator for 
the income development of younger cohorts (if cohort effects exist), comparisons between 
lifetime and periodical income distribution need to make suppositions about the further 
course of incomes for the younger population. Thus, a completed empirical appraisal is not 
possible.80 
Another important and similar aspect concerning the comparison between longitudinal and 
cross-sectional inequality is the difference between permanent and transitory inequality. In 
this context Burkhauser and Poupore (1997) stated, on the basis of different income defini-
tions for the confrontation of the USA with western Germany, that both the transitory and the 
permanent inequality were higher in the USA than in western Germany in the 1980s. At this, 
in order to determine the permanent, longitudinal income inequality (on an individual level) 
they used a mobility indicator developed by Shorrocks (R). R is defined as the value of in-
come inequality over a long period of time (i. e., for many years) and a weighted average 
value of the yearly inequality values. The higher R is the higher the permanent fraction of 
inequality is. If R equals 1, it is indicated that the economy is fully immobile, and all meas-
ured inequality is called permanent. 
It is the inclusion of the longitudinal dimension which allows the separation between pure age 
and cohort effects. Through this, the question about generational equity can be answered 
more comprehensively than in a pure cross-sectional analysis.81 
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